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Cybersecurity has become a major problem in the political management of 
global economic activities. This article examines how cybersecurity emerged 
as a challenge in global political economy. The post-Cold War global spread 
of the Internet and digital technologies happened largely without companies 
and countries worrying about threats to information, software, and network 
security. However, as dependence on cyber technologies grew and as conditions 
in international politics changed, cybersecurity became a serious problem that 
adversely affects international economic relations. The article also considers 
the prospects for improved cooperation on cybersecurity within global political 
economy. 
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he rise of cybersecurity as a policy challenge is a multifaceted global 
phenomenon. States debate how the security of digital technologies 
affects cyberspace, geopolitics, armed conflict, international law, and 
human rights. Cybersecurity has also become an issue in global polit-
ical economy, or the political management of global economic activities. Breaches 
of computer systems generate economic costs individuals, companies, and govern-
ments bear, including the costs of defending against cyber threats. But, even though 
substantial, these costs do not tell the whole story about how cybersecurity affects 
global economic relations. 
Cybersecurity emerged as an issue in global political economy through two phases. 
After the end of the Cold War, a convergence of political, economic, and technolog-
ical factors stimulated the integration of Internet-linked technologies into econom-
ic activities and the globalization of this behavior. These developments happened 
without the security of digital data, software, hardware, and computer networks 
becoming a major issue for companies or governments. However, growing depen-
dence on insecure technologies produced significant cybersecurity problems. This 
phase revealed that cyber vulnerabilities were embedded and globalized in ways 
that undermine economic benefits associated with digital technology and harm eco-
nomic relations among states.
The threat includes not only the costs companies and economies suffer from ma-
levolent cyber activities but also the impact of government policy on cybersecurity 
dangers. Governance actions reflect different understandings of cybersecurity and 
produce fragmentation in measures affecting the private sector. As a result, the polit-
ical management of global economic affairs confronts problems related to national 
policy responses to cybersecurity threats.
The next phase is unfolding as countries formulate ways to advance the global economic 
benefits associated with cyber technologies while addressing cybersecurity. States are 
trying to balance the liberalization of digital commerce with the protection of national 
security and to cooperate on strengthening national cyber defenses. The need to calibrate 
economic and security interests is familiar in global political economy, but how well 
governments accomplish this task concerning cybersecurity remains to be seen. 
Cyberspace and Global Political Economy
A Remarkable Convergence 
The study of global political economy uses economic and political analyses to un-
derstand how state and non-state actors organize transnational economic activities.1 
1 Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001).
T
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Technology has long been important to the governance of international economics. 
Trade and investment liberalization facilitates cross-border flows of technology and 
its economic benefits, but political problems also arise. During the Cold War, devel-
oping countries demanded greater access to advanced technologies, and capitalist 
states sought to prevent exports of technologies of national security importance to 
socialist nations. 
Explaining how cybersecurity affects 
global political economy begins with 
understanding how the technologies 
responsible for cyberspace spread glob-
ally. In political economy terms, get-
ting countries to liberalize trade and 
investment required intergovernmental 
agreements, as reflected in the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and bilater-
al investment treaties. This governance architecture proved necessary to create the 
benefits liberalized trade and investment can produce, including those associated 
with technological innovation. By contrast, the Internet became a global economic 
juggernaut without needing such architecture. How did this happen?
Cyber technologies came of age during unprecedented global political and econom-
ic changes. First, the Cold War had ended, leaving behind the rigid, ideology-riven 
bipolar structure that fragmented post-World War II international economic gover-
nance. This development opened space for trade and investment to expand. Second, 
the US emerged as the most powerful country, and US interests favored globaliza-
tion. Third, countries reformed the trade system through the WTO, which made 
liberalized trade prominent in economic globalization.
Although not specific to any technology, these developments created political and 
economic conditions conducive to the global spread of the Internet and related dig-
ital technologies as these became increasingly accessible and useful from the mid-
1990s. The Internet’s diffusion faced no security constraints related to the balance 
of power, was propelled by the dominant country, and was supported by governance 
reforms that liberalized economic relations among nations. In global political econ-
omy terms, what happened was a remarkable convergence of technological innova-
tion, political transformation, and economic liberalization. 
In another unprecedented feature of this period, the Internet went global without the 
involvement of mechanisms established to oversee international communications. 
“Cyber technologies came 
of age during unprecedented 
global political and 
economic changes.”
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Previous technologies, such as the telegraph, radio, and telephony, were subject 
to international institutions and regulation. After World War II, such governance 
occurred through the UN’s International Telecommunication Union (ITU), an insti-
tution that began as the International Telegraph Union in 1865.2 However, the ITU 
did not manage the Internet’s expansion or regulate it. Nor did it determine how 
the Internet functions. Instead, a “multi-stakeholder” process involving academ-
ics, companies, non-governmental organizations, and government representatives 
governs the Internet.3 The post-Cold War convergence of technology, politics, and 
economics facilitated the extraordinary governance associated with the Internet’s 
spread.
The speed and scale at which the Internet 
globalized demonstrated that it creat-
ed benefits for commercial enterprises, 
including increased efficiency, compet-
itiveness, productivity, market access, 
and innovation. These incentives pow-
ered the digital economy’s emergence. 
As more businesses harnessed online 
strategies, being offline ceased to be vi-
able, and Internet-based business mod-
els generated a multiplier effect across 
markets. The manner in which the Internet was disseminated facilitated widespread 
exploitation of these firm-level advantages.
During the Cold War, international political economy included analyzing rival cap-
italist, socialist, and developing-world perspectives on economic relations.4 Such 
competition did not affect the emergence of cyberspace and the process of dig-
ital globalization. These developments became intertwined with liberal political 
and economic thinking. The Internet became integral to market liberalization, eco-
nomic interdependence, democracy, and individual rights. The Soviet Union’s col-
lapse ended socialism’s ability to compete as an ideology, and developing countries 
focused on integrating with global markets and shrinking the “digital divide” rather 
than railing against the impoverished periphery’s dependence on the wealthy, ex-
ploitative core. 
2 “Overview of ITU’s History,” International Telecommunication Union (ITU), www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/
ITUsHistory.aspx 
3 Wolfgang Kleinwachter, “The History of Internet Governance,” in Christian Moller and Arnaud Amouroux (eds.), 
Governing the Internet: Freedom and Regulation in the OSCE Region (Vienna: OSCE, 2007), pp. 41-64.
4 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
“The post-Cold War 
convergence of technology, 
politics, and economics 
facilitated the extraordinary 
governance associated with 
the Internet’s spread.”
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The Absence of Cybersecurity 
Missing from this narrative is cybersecurity. Generally, the security of information 
on, and traveling among, networked computer systems did not, in this formative pe-
riod, attract the policy attention that commercial exploitation of digital technologies 
generated. The Internet was engineered with openness and accessibility, not secu-
rity, as primary objectives. The development of software, including applications to 
run on the Internet, also happened without much consideration given to information, 
product, or network security.
Cybersecurity concerns that arose did 
not factor significantly in the emerging 
global political economy of the digital 
age. US policymakers identified the 
need to protect national critical infra-
structure from terrorist cyber attacks,5 
and the Council of Europe negotiated 
the Convention on Cybercrime to ad-
dress criminal activities in cyberspace.6 
Some governments began to think 
about military applications, such as us-
ing cyber weapons in armed conflict.7 These examples reveal policy concerns about 
cybersecurity, but the concerns were not strong enough to divert the trajectory of 
economic activities becoming dependent on cyber technologies.
A different perspective on cybersecurity also appeared in this period. US and 
European interest in cyber terrorism, cyber crime, and cyber weapons focused on 
the vulnerability of information, software, and networks. However, Russia and 
China worried that US political, economic, technological, and military dominance 
in cyberspace posed security threats beyond vulnerabilities in digital technologies. 
This broader reading of cybersecurity connected the new realm of cyber to tradition-
al geopolitics. For example, Russia tried through the UN to advance proposals based 
on its interests, but these efforts did not gain traction because the dominant power, 
the United States, opposed them.8
5  Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 22 May 1998.
6 Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No. 185, 23 November 2001, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/185.htm
7 An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations, U.S. Department of Defense Office of 
General Counsel, (May 1999).
8 Dorothy Denning, “Reflections on Cyberweapons Control,” Computer Security Journal, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Fall 2014), 
pp. 43-53.
“US accusations against 
Chinese cyber espionage 
targeting US companies and 
government agencies have 
contributed to souring Sino-
American relations.”
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Cybersecurity as a Problem for Global Political Economy
Cybersecurity Emerges
Although marginal to global political economy in this formative period, cybersecu-
rity – in its technological and geopolitical meanings – subsequently emerged as a 
major issue in global economic affairs. Cybersecurity now features prominently in 
important economic relationships, such as between the US and the EU, and the US 
and China. Cybersecurity problems affect efforts to advance trade and investment 
liberalization, including in negotiations on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreements. The need to 
address cybersecurity also arises in development activities to facilitate utilization of 
digital technologies by developing countries.
This change flows from transformed circumstances in global political economy, includ-
ing at the enterprise level, in markets for digital goods and services, and in the global 
balance of power. Put simply, awareness of cybersecurity vulnerabilities and their eco-
nomic costs and political implications increased while policy responses to these prob-
lems fragmented in ways that threaten the Internet’s role in global economic activities.
As noted above, the digital revolution unfolded without much attention paid to the 
security of information, software, networks, and Internet-enabled transmissions. This 
marginalization of cybersecurity reflected market and governance failures that crimi-
nals, terrorists, and governments began to exploit on a massive scale, which generated 
escalating economic costs and political problems. Cyber crime grew in scale, sever-
ity, and sophistication. Governance efforts at national and international levels have 
not kept pace. Despite being open for adoption since 2001, only 46 countries have 
joined the Convention on Cybercrime. Terrorists use the Internet for multiple pur-
poses, including communication, propaganda, and recruitment, but law enforcement 
and intelligence responses to terrorist use of the Internet create costly challenges for 
companies. States have taken advantage of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to engage in 
extensive cyber surveillance and espionage against foreign nationals, companies, and 
governments, practices that have caused serious problems between countries.
Government surveillance and espionage have caused the most damage in global 
political economy terms. US accusations against Chinese cyber espionage targeting 
US companies and government agencies have contributed to souring Sino-American 
relations. Disclosures by Edward Snowden, a former contractor for the US National 
Security Agency, made matters worse because they revealed US operations against 
Chinese companies (e.g., Huawei) and government targets. Snowden’s disclosures 
also damaged US-EU relations because they included information about US spying 
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against European nationals, politicians, and companies. The European Parliament 
threatened to withhold support from the TTIP agreement unless the US met EU 
demands, including on privacy.9
Data Localization and Policy Fragmentation
The Snowden revelations produced 
interest by governments in data-local-
ization requirements that mandate com-
panies to store data within the country, 
rather than transmitting and storing the 
data elsewhere.10 This development re-
flects security, privacy, and commercial 
issues arising from the global domi-
nance of US cyber companies. From 
a security perspective, this dominance 
means that information generated inside 
a country often flows through the US, 
and, thus, is vulnerable to US govern-
ment access. For some countries, such access also raises worries that cross-border 
data flows dilute privacy protections for personal information. Finally, data localiza-
tion could give domestic companies more business opportunities rather than having 
US enterprises dominate digital commerce. 
Interest in data localization highlights that responses to cybersecurity vulnerabilities 
exhibit fragmentation through emphasis on national measures rather than collec-
tive action. In this vein, China has used Snowden’s disclosures to advance Chinese 
“techno-nationalism,” impose cybersecurity requirements on foreign companies, 
and emphasize Chinese sovereignty over the Internet and cyberspace. In the wake 
of Snowden’s leaks, the EU has insisted that the US government and US-based com-
panies meet its data-protection standards for information concerning EU nationals. 
The EU has proposed regulations to require commercial enterprises in the common 
market to strengthen cybersecurity.11 US and European political leaders are increas-
ingly demanding that social media companies do more to combat terrorist use of 
their services. 
9 On the Snowden disclosures, see: David P. Fidler (ed.), The Snowden Reader (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2015).
10 Karen Kornbluh, “Beyond Borders: Fighting Data Protectionism,” Democracy: A Journal of Ideas (Fall 2014), 
www.democracyjournal.org/34/beyond-borders-fighting-data-.php?page=all 
11 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning Measures to Ensure a High 
Common Level of Network and Information Security Across the Union, European Commission, COM (2013) 48 final, 
7 February 2013.
“One consequence of the 
Edward Snowden disclosures 
was global blowback against 
US tech companies for 
being perceived as complicit 
with US surveillance 
and espionage.”
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The Problem of US Tech Dominance
A thread running through responses to cybersecurity threats is the dominance of 
US-based companies in digital commerce. For governments around the world, this 
dominance makes these companies critical to law enforcement and intelligence 
efforts to combat crime, counter terrorism, and address other security challenges. 
One consequence of the Snowden disclosures was global blowback against US tech 
companies for being perceived as complicit with US surveillance and espionage. 
Given the importance of global markets, these companies sought to restore customer 
confidence by, among other things, strengthening the use of encrypted communi-
cations. This move sparked controversy, as the US and other governments warned 
about the threat encryption poses to law enforcement and intelligence efforts in a 
cyber-dependent world.12
Although dominance of US tech com-
panies increases vulnerabilities to US 
spying and creates incentives for data 
localization, cybersecurity is also a fig 
leaf obscuring other reasons why coun-
tries chafe at this dominance. From a 
global political economy perspec-
tive, the Internet’s globalization has 
not produced competitive markets for 
Internet services. In theory, technology 
diffusion should increase competition among firms selling goods and services. In 
practice, US companies have repeatedly become the dominant enterprises. This 
phenomenon has occurred in the EU’s common market so frequently that the EU 
increasingly resorts to competition law to accuse US tech companies of abusing 
their dominant positions. Other countries, such as India and Brazil, are also using 
competition law to address the market power of US tech enterprises. This turn 
to competition law creates problems in political and economic relations with the 
United States. 
Geopolitical Changes and Authoritarian Cybersecurity  
Cybersecurity’s rise in global political economy also connects to changes in the 
distribution of power in the international system. During the Internet’s globaliza-
tion, US power was unmatched and largely unchallenged. This hegemonic status 
helps explain why the US could brush off Russian and Chinese efforts to shape 
12 Spencer Ackerman, “FBI Chief Wants ‘Backdoor Access’ to Encrypted Communications to Fight ISIS,” The 
Guardian, 8 July 2015, www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/08/fbi-chief-backdoor-access-encryption-isis
“Consensus on regulating 
economic cyber espionage to 
address the damage it inflicts 
on companies and diplomatic 
relations is not likely.”
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cyberspace and Internet governance at the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 
2000s. However, as the first decade of the new century progressed, American he-
gemony receded, and China and Russia began to challenge the US. Chinese and 
Russian attempts to bring Internet governance more under governmental and in-
tergovernmental control scored a coup in 2012 at an ITU conference that adopted, 
over US opposition, revised international telecommunication regulations that, for 
the first time, included cyber elements.13
Chinese and Russian assertiveness reflects not only shifts in the balance of pow-
er but also increasing confidence by authoritarian states in their ability to handle 
challenges posed by the Internet. As noted above, the prevailing narrative in the 
post-Cold War period linked the Internet with free markets, democracy, and human 
rights. In the crosshairs of this perspective were non-democratic states. However, 
many authoritarian governments defied expectations by increasing Internet usage 
among their populations and their control over cyber activities.14 Driving such con-
trol is a broad reading of cybersecurity that justifies extensive government interfer-
ence in individual and private sector Internet use and, thus, emphasizes sovereignty 
over liberalized communications, cross-border data flows, and digital commerce. 
Cybersecurity and the Digital Divide
Cybersecurity has also become part of development thinking about the digital divide. 
With high- and middle-income economies experiencing cybersecurity problems caused 
by dependence on networked digital technologies, advocacy for developing countries 
to adopt these technologies for economic growth can no longer overlook cybersecurity. 
As one expert argued, “attempts to reduce the digital divide through investment in infra-
structure only, without taking into account the need for security and control of IT risks 
(…) would result in the creation of a security divide as prejudicial as the digital divide.”15 
The African Union’s negotiation of the Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data 
Protection reflects awareness that African governments have responsibilities to address 
security vulnerabilities that come with cyber-driven development.16
Global Political Economy and Managing Cybersecurity
With cybersecurity now a major issue in global economic relations, will com-
panies and countries devise better ways to manage this challenge? The serious-
ness of this problem arose from market and governance failures to address the 
13 David P. Fidler, “Internet Governance and International Law: The Controversy Concerning the Revision of the 
International Telecommunication Regulations,” American Society of International Law Insights, 7 February 2013, 
www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/6/internet-governance-and-international-law-controversy-concerning-revision 
14 Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).
15 Solange Ghernaouti, Cyber Power: Crime, Conflict and Security in Cyberspace (Lausanne: EPFL Press, 2013), p. 341.
16 African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection, EX.CL/846 (XXV), 27 June 2014.
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vulnerabilities dependence on cyber technologies produces. Although companies 
are more aware of the dangers, the private sector continues to struggle in balanc-
ing incentives for harnessing technological innovation and the need for greater 
information, software, and network security. New services, such as cloud comput-
ing, are claimed to offer better cybersecurity. However, technological fixes will 
not solve the problem, especially when innovations on the horizon, such as the 
Internet of Things and Internet-linked commercial drones, potentially exacerbate 
cybersecurity threats. As described above, most government responses to cyber-
security problems have been domestically focused, reflect different perspectives 
on what cybersecurity means, and are fragmented along national lines rather than 
coordinated through collective action. The need for better cooperation is apparent, 
but prospects are mixed, at best.
Consensus on regulating economic cyber espionage to address the damage it inflicts 
on companies and diplomatic relations is not likely. Nor do credible options exist to 
reduce political and economic tensions associated with major countries, especially 
China and Russia, exercising Internet sovereignty more vigorously. The economic 
cyber espionage and Internet sovereignty issues are intertwined with geopolitical 
problems characterizing US-Russia and US-China relations, which makes coopera-
tion on cybersecurity all the more difficult.
From a global political economy perspective, negotiations to liberalize trade and 
investment are more interesting. Many countries are participating in efforts to con-
clude agreements that would liberalize trade in information technology products, 
trade in services utilizing cyber technologies, and digital commerce. E-commerce 
provisions in the proposed TPP agreement include not only traditional obligations 
(such as non-discriminatory treatment) but also new rules on ensuring cross-border 
data flows and restricting data localization requirements.17 If accepted, such rules 
could be an important development in efforts to liberalize economic activities that 
harness the potential of cyber technologies.
Negotiating rules on cross-border data flows and data localization requirements forc-
es countries to address how these rules might affect national measures on various 
issues, including cybersecurity and privacy. Trade and investment liberalization has 
frequently required negotiators to balance this objective with other interests, such as 
protecting public morals, health, or national security. The balancing involves iden-
tifying legitimate reasons for restricting trade or investment, ensuring restrictions 
are necessary and are not abused, and resolving disagreements through dispute set-
tlement. If the TPP and TTIP agreements follow this approach in their e-commerce 
17 “Trans-Pacific Partnership: E-Commerce and Telecommunications,” United States Trade Representative, 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-chapter-chapter-negotiating-6 
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provisions, then they will produce new governance for digital commerce that could 
affect national measures on cybersecurity and privacy. 
Other efforts to strengthen collective action are underway. For example, countries, 
companies, and intergovernmental organizations established the Global Forum on 
Cyber Expertise in April 2015.18 The objective is to build capabilities within coun-
tries and the private sector to engage in e-commerce governance, protect privacy, 
bridge the digital divide, and manage cybersecurity threats. International coopera-
tion on protecting critical infrastructure from cyber threats and improving coordina-
tion among national computer incident response teams is also increasing.19Although 
something of a patchwork, these and other efforts might become important to global 
political economy if they influence government policies and private sector thinking 
about cybersecurity. 
The task ahead requires understanding we can neither reproduce the conditions 
under which the Internet globalized without much concern for cybersecurity nor 
accept the damage cyber threats and fragmented policy responses to them pose to 
global political economy. The next part of the story might reflect patterns familiar 
from history – the painstaking, uneven, and decades-long crafting of collective gov-
ernance that advances economic growth and national security. 
18 Global Forum on Cyber Expertise, https://www.gccs2015.com/gfce
19 David P. Fidler, “Cyber Norm Development and the Protection of Critical Infrastructure,” Net Politics, 23 July 
2015, http://blogs.cfr.org/cyber/2015/07/23/cyber-norm-development-and-the-protection-of-critical-infrastructure/
